CV19 Impact on World Affairs
In 1945 three men sat down at Yalta to discuss the future shape of Europe and world peace. If a similar meeting were to happen once the danger of Covid-19 has passed it is unlikely that all three would be white, and even less likely they would all be men. What is likely though, if history is our guide, is that substantial changes to the existing world order will occur as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. The longer the crisis continues, the more likely there will be change.
In the many articles written on Covid-19 there is a common chorus, that it will change us, that when this is over we will not simply return to life as it was, that the future will be different, but that is where many columnists stop, lacking the vision or the courage to actually state how the world and our lives will be different.
I intend to take the bold step, through a number of articles, of providing a possible scenario of what the near future may look like, from global to local: the near future meaning the first few years following the depths of the crisis. To be clear, the scenarios are not what I desire, but a best guess of the shape of things to come.
This article focuses on international affairs alone: the related topics of travel and trade and a potential for a rise in xenophobia will be covered next.
Covid-19 has been likened to ‘our world war’, due to the degree of disruption to our lives rather than the actual cost in lives. Both the World Wars changed the world order, with WW1 spawning the League of Nations and WW2 the United Nations: each of which was an attempt to draw countries closer together to avoid conflict. As with the post world war changes, the reshaping after this crisis will be influenced by not just the event itself but the forces already underway before the event.
The starting point for this discussion must be the origin of the virus itself – China. The most likely change will be a less open and less accommodating relationship with China for most countries, especially the liberal democracies. The delicate manoeuvring around sensitive issues will give way to greater suspicion and more direct language. The existing unspoken, almost hidden cold war that has been underway for some time will become public and spoken of more freely. The gloves are not off, it will be a cold war, not a real one.
The shift in relations with China is in response to China’s approach to managing the virus. China denied the existence of the virus initially, downplayed it’s seriousness and then apparently delayed the sharing of technical medical information that is required to support the development of techniques to treat the symptoms and commence the development of a vaccine. This will not be forgotten. The challenge for leaders of western nations will be to avoid a descent into racism, and stay focused on the issue of their authoritarian leadership structure.
While it is true that most countries were slow to respond to the outbreak, and may have been equally slow even if China had alerted the world earlier, it is conceivable that the entire trajectory of this pandemic could have been very different had the Chinese government been more open.
A shift in the treatment of China was underway prior to the pandemic, the United States in particular had become vocal about their frustration that increases in wealth within China had not led to a reduction in the control of the central government. The hoped for liberalising effect of higher incomes had not materialised, feeding the sense that the liberal democratic countries were yet again faced with a monolithic authoritarian country seemingly intent on undermining the existing rules based international order.
The decision by most western countries to ban Huawei from contributing to the development of 5G communication networks had been taken before Covid-19: expect similar such actions after the pandemic.
A year after Yalta, when a greater number of world leaders met to establish the United Nations in the shadow of two World Wars, they must have known that creating a structure to enable nations to work peacefully and cooperatively was an ambitious project.
As we emerge from this pandemic the façade covering the dysfunctional nature of the institutions of the United Nations will crumble. The institutions suited the purposes of those striving for strong cross border institutions to manage global issues, but they became a façade hiding those who aimed to undermine such efforts and were routinely manipulated by the most powerful countries.
The response to the virus has seen countries with federal systems of government dissolve into their constituent states in order to more effectively fight the virus. Europe, apart from closing it’s borders has failed to co-ordinate a response on any dimension eg medical, economic. This dissolution will spread to international bodies.
Without the pain of a war to pull us together the suspicion and mistrust between nations that existed before will continue, hollowing out the United Nations.
A theme to re-emerge in international relations will be trust, and the degree of trust between nations will be linked to the extent that each nation can trust the reported viral status and management effort of each nation. This will deepen the fault lines that currently exist between nations, such as those between Russia and the West, between countries in the old USSR that have maintained strong ties to Russia and those that have shifted their allegiances to the west, between countries in the middle east and other regions.
A consequence of a hollowing out of the UN and a move to trust based international relations will be the development or strengthening of regional or ideological blocs. At each escalation point during the pandemic, individual countries did not look outwards for cross border co-ordination, but inwards: assistance is flowing into some countries but it is through bilateral channels, not centrally co-ordinated by a UN body. Once the initial peak of health risk has passed, and countries attempt to reinvigorate trade and travel, they will do so by relying upon blocs that already exist.
The composition of these blocs, and the strength they have, will be based on the degree of trust each country has in the other’s ability to manage the virus and be open about the spread and containment strategies of the virus. Borders will not automatically open between two near neighbours, but between two countries that are comfortable with the level of risk posed by the other country.
Another key factor to impact relations between countries will be the extent of assistance provided during the crisis. This will be truer for countries in Africa and South America that may not have the industrial capacity to produce their own medical supplies and rely on provisions from other countries: a friend in need is a friend indeed.
The Russian – China alliance will continue to strengthen, but it will not hold. History shows that alliances between authoritarian states are inherently unstable. The alliance will hold while ever each country allows the other to be preeminent in their respective spheres of influence but the difference between their own views of themselves will grow over time – each sees themselves as a global power, but only China really is. But ultimately, what will be the strategic benefit of a Russian – Chinese alliance if the countries that gravitate towards them are suffering through a depression? In the near term, the period covered by this analysis, countries supported by China through the pandemic will remain loyal to China, but afterwards they will be just as easily bought by another suitor.
The US is likely to suffer badly from this virus with a predicted high death rate and unemployment rates approaching depression era levels, made worse by the pandemic occurring during an election year, impacting the cohesion of their response. Does this spell the end of the American era? No.
The end of American hegemony has been predicted for almost as long as it has existed. Although the last two US presidents seemed to have had a deliberate policy of reducing the role of the US in world affairs, American approaches to policy continue to hold sway and American’s actions continue to define world affairs. I promised firm positions, but on this question I must equivocate. Beyond the term of the current President the world will still look to the US for leadership and coalition building in times of conflict, but in other matters their role will be diminished, not extinguished. In the new era countries will be judged on their response to the virus and their ability to assist other countries and on both counts America will not score well.
What does all this mean for global warming? I am hopeful. Finally, in the year leading up to the pandemic, the world had become ready to take real action on climate change, and then the virus hit. Climate change policies will be baked in to the economic stimulus packages implemented, at least in the developed world. The claim that we cannot take action for fear it will impact our economies is now meaningless – the economies have stalled. A pre-requisite for restarting will be consideration of climate change.
The age of terrorism is over. We will continue to fear random acts of mindless violence, but the potential for an act of terrorism to have a significant impact on our way of life, for it to strike a blow against our system, is now greatly reduced. We feared the potential for terrorism to disrupt our economies and our way of life – but it is impossible now for an act of terrorism to create a situation any worse than we have now, and our ability to recover from any future act will be greater because of what we have gone through already, and also the changes based on learnings from this event yet to be made. Terrorism might continue, but only to cause pain, not to disrupt.
The United Nations, formed in response to two devastating wars with the aim of promoting peace and cooperation has been challenged by the underlying tension that exists between states with different governance structures – dictatorships and democracies. These tensions existed before the pandemic and the pandemic will not resolve them.
The overriding desire of people within each country devastated by war is to avoid the need to fight again. War was created by people, and can therefore only be prevented by people. The overriding desire of people within each country impacted by Covid-19 will be to recover their previous life, and they will only see the need to work together to the extent required to achieve that aim.
